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With autonomous vehicles (AVs), a major concern is the inability to give mean-
ingful quantitative assurance of safety, to the extent required by society – e.g. that
an AV must be at least as safe as a good human driver – before that AV is in ex-
tensive use. We demonstrate an approach to achieving more moderate, but useful,
confidence, e.g., confidence of low enough probability of causing accidents in the
early phases of operation. This formalises mathematically the common approach
of operating a system on a limited basis in the hope that mishap-free operation
will confirm one’s confidence in its safety and allow progressively more extensive
operation: a process of “bootstrapping” of confidence. Translating that intuitive
approach into theorems shows: (1) that it is substantially sound in the right cir-
cumstances, and could be a good method for deciding about the early deployment
phase for an AV; (2) how much confidence can be rightly derived from such a “cau-
tious deployment” approach, so that we can avoid over-optimism; (3) under which
conditions our sound formulas for future confidence are applicable; (4) thus, which
analyses of the concrete situations, and/or constraints on practice, are needed in
order to enjoy the advantages of provably correct confidence in adequate future
safety.
1 Introduction
A major concern for developers of autonomous vehicle, authorities responsible for au-
thorising their use, and end users, is how to achieve confidence that they will be safe
enough in operation. The safety objectives are inevitably, at least in part, quantita-
tive: we do not want accidents to be too frequent. This might be stated as a specific
maximum frequency of accidents or fatalities per mile, or a requirement that these
frequencies be no greater than some fraction of the average for human drivers, or com-
parable to the better human drivers, etc.. It is important to have quantitative arguments
*This work was supported in part by ICRI-SAVe, the Intel Collaborative Research Institute on Safe Au-
tomated Vehicles.
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that properly demonstrate what level of confidence we can have in these requirements
being satisfied.
However, a major difficulty arises when spelling out these quantitative requirements
for road vehicles on public roads: when these reasonable requirements are translated
into numerical targets about, for instance, a low enough “probability of fatal accidents
per mile driven”, demonstrating that the requirement is satisfied by just operating the
vehicles and collecting statistical evidence is impractical. The cost and practical dif-
ficulties in building such confidence statistically seem unsurmountable [1], as demon-
strated previously by other authors [2, 3]. Even when one takes into account evidence
accumulated prior to operation or testing – evidence of precautions taken in develop-
ment and in the system design, as is normal for safety-critical systems – one would need
this evidence to support such strong confidence that few would consider the argument
believable [4], especially for functions based on machine learning.
The problem is not that the mathematical methods are faulty, but that these very
low rates of accidents, although reasonable to require, are hard to believe without large
amounts of empirical evidence.
It turns out that an alternative useful quantitative claim can be more easily sup-
ported, about the probability of safety over a finite amount of future operation [5].
That is, the claim supported is not that the probability per mile is less than a cer-
tain number, but that the probability of a mishap occurring during a period of future
operation is less than a certain probability. For instance, for a nuclear reactor protec-
tion system or a critical flight control function, the practical requirement is that causing
accidents must be unlikely over the whole lifetime of the type. For a vehicle which is
being operated so as to gain confidence to warrant further operation, this requirement
might be that accidents be unlikely over the next few months or years of operation. The
claim could be that for a fleet of cars there is a 90% probability that it will not suffer
accidents due to its self-driving functions, over the next year of operation. In this paper,
we demonstrate how this approach can support confidence in safety in some scenarios,
including the early adoption stage for a new vehicle.
Many different kinds of AVs are in development or in use, creating many different
scenarios for this problem of gaining confidence in their safety. We will refer to two
types of AVs that are at opposite extremes of the range, from the viewpoint of how easy
or hard it is to accumulate confidence in their future safety from progressively extended
periods of operation. At one end of the spectrum, we will call “A-type” vehicles those
“SAE level 5” AVs meant to be sold to many millions of ordinary consumers and to
transport them over public roads, in complex and quite unpredictable environments. At
the opposite end, we will call “Z-type” those AVs that are deployed in small numbers
to perform well-understood, limited tasks in constrained and protected environments,
e.g., a self-moving crane in a factory or a heavy truck in an open-face mine.
Z-type AVs may still have extreme safety requirements (e.g. if they transport dan-
gerous material in a chemical plant), but the simpler environment and less pressure for
high performance and fast evolution reduce difficulties in both their development and
assessment.
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2 Basic model and results
We show the reasoning for the case that the process of mishaps occurring1 can be mod-
elled as “Bernoulli trials”: the system is subjected to a series of demands, and mishaps
on different demands are independent events with the same probability (probability of
failure per demand, pfd). Bernoulli processes are a common model for failure pro-
cesses [6, 7]. One could call “demand” a single trip; or, as in [1, 4], driving a mile or a
kilometre. If mishaps are rare, the Bernoulli process should be a tolerable approxima-
tion of reality (see [4] for a discussion and references), despite the fact that successive
demands, if defined this way, are not independent [8].
Our proposed way of reasoning used Bayesian inference: the uncertain values of
interest are considered random variables, with a “prior” distribution that represents the
state of knowledge and uncertainty about their values before new evidence is observed,
which is updated on the basis of this new evidence. In this context, the new evidence
is that some amount of operation was completed with no mishaps. In particular, we
used the approach that we call “conservative Bayesian inference”: we avoid the need
to specify the prior distribution in full, and instead depend on specifying only some
characteristics of it that one can trust to have reasons for believing. This approach is
detailed elsewhere (e.g. [9, section 3], for a general description; [5] for the specific
models applied in the present paper). These details do not matter here; the essence of
our previous results is that, on the basis of a very limited partial description of the prior
distribution, they allowed one to state rigorously, after observing a period of mishap-
free operation, what confidence could then have “as a minimum” that the system would
not suffer mishaps over a certain future amount of operation.
Our premises were:
• the real question of interest is whether the risk of having any mishap over a
certain period of operation (e.g., the whole lifetime of the system; or the next
year of operation) is acceptably low (in other cases, whether the probability of
too many mishaps is); estimating a pfd is just a mathematical detail of how one
can answer this question;
• for many systems, there is strong confidence, before we start operating them,
that they are sufficiently safe. Indeed, those deciding to start operation of such
systems would not do so if they did not have this confidence. The source of
the confidence is typically in that these systems were developed following good
quality practice, the code was extensively verified, etc. How much confidence
this evidence should really generate is a separate problem.
This prior confidence is affected by uncertainty, of course. Expensively developed
and verified systems have been put into operation despite failure modes with astonish-
ing high probabilities: historically, e.g., the early Space Shuttle software had a prob-
ability of 1 in 67 of per flight of failing to start; the initial version of the Ariane 5’s
control system, a 100% probability of destroying the rocket. In general, a thorough
interrogation of what one knows should indicate some estimate of a probability (less
1We use the word mishap as an umbrella term for the negative event about which one wants to give pre-
dictions. Some may want to reason about probability of a deadly accident as in [1,4], or of any accident, or of
any potential accident, e.g. any violation of an assigned safety envelope, or even a failure that analyses reveal
could cause an accident. In safety, this last definition (potential accident) is typically the one would want
to use; but to have data for statistical inference, it may be necessary to reason just about serious accidents,
those that are reported and will appear in logs.
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than 100%) that the pfd is acceptably low. We note that this is a Bayesian probability:
the system’s pfd, given the way the system will be used and the world around it, is
a specific number, but is unknown. This probability of acceptable pfd describes our
“epistemic” uncertainty about what the pfd’s real value is; this uncertainty is a crucial
factor in our decision whether to take the “gamble” of operating the system.
In Bayesian terms, the unknown pfd is a random variable – we will call it Q for
brevity – and our uncertainty about it is described by a probability distribution, say a
probability density function, fQ (q).
2.1 Argument based on probability of pfd= 0
The simplest version of our conservative form of reasoning applies for systems so sim-
ple that one has some substantial confidence that they are free from safety-relevant
faults, i.e., that their pfd is zero.2
Of course one never has 100% confidence of this. Thus a parameter of this kind
of argument is the probability Pp of the statement “pfd= 0” being true. So, with
probabilityPp the system has zero probability of mishap per demand: we could operate
it for an infinite amount of time and a mishap would never happen (remember that we
are talking about mishaps due to the design of the self-driving function, not to physical
failures, or to fatally reckless behaviour of other drivers, “acts of God”, etc.: with this
restrictive focus, if there is no fault in the system, it will never fail so as to generate a
mishap). With probability (1 − Pp), thus, the system does have design faults and will
– sooner or later – fail: experience a mishap. The Bayesian description of the problem
is that the pfd may have any value, with different probabilities: using the notation we
used earlier [5], we call Q the unknown pfd. Q is a random variable, with a prior
probability density function fQ(q), which in this case is.
fQ (q) = Pp δ (q) + (1− Pp) fQn (q) (1)
where δ(q) is Dirac’s delta function and fQn (q) is the probability density function
(pdf ) for the system pfd conditional on pfd> 0.
If the future period of operation for which we wish to know that the system is safe









(1− q)Tfut (Pp δ (q) + (1− Pp) fQn (q))dq
= Pp + (1− Pp)
∫ 1
0+
(1− q)Tfut fQN (q) dq (2)
One can observe that the reliability will stay higher than Pp for any duration of
future operation; the risk we take in the “gamble” of operating this system is a weighted
sum between zero risk (if pfd= 0 is true) and the risk due the potential defects in the
system. If we were just concerned with a confidence bound on pfd, we would ignore
2This case is convenient for the purpose of presentation since its results yield simpler plots than the
general case, which we introduce in section 3.1.2, of imperfect confidence in the pfd being lower than a
small, non-zero bound.
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the fact that with a certain probability those defects are absent and thus pose no risk in
operation. That is, we would be needlessly pessimistic. Once we start operating the
system, operation experience feeds new evidence about how much we should trust the
hypothesis that pfd= 0.
2.2 How no-mishap operation extends the confidence horizon
After Tpast independent demands without mishaps, the posterior probability of Tfut




(1− q)Tpast+Tfut fQ (q) dq
∫ 1
0
(1− q)Tpast fQ (q) dq
(3)
As mentioned earlier, so that the results can be trusted not to be an artefact of un-
justified details of the prior distribution, we applied our “conservative Bayes” method:
given a value of Pp, and assuming we do not know the rest of the prior distribution,
fQN (q), our method obtains the most pessimistic posterior reliability, for any pair
{Tpast, Tfut}, compatible with that Pp [5]. Thus our confidence in future mishap-free
operation is the most pessimistic given these inputs. Clearly one could study “confi-
dence bootstrapping” with any other choice of prior distribution. The advantage of our
approach is the guaranteed conservatism with respect to uncertainties about the detailed
prior distribution of the pfd.
Figure 1 exemplifies the results of the conservative inference. In this scenario where
the prior distribution is described only via its Pp value, this probability is a function of
the ratio Tfut/Tpast, so these bi-dimensional plots are sufficient to describe, for any
values of Pp and Tpast, the probability of having any mishaps over a certain Tfut. Our
confidence level is 1 minus that value: the probability of no mishap happening in the
next Tfut amount of operation. So, given thePp that one trusts, and the confidence level
one desires in future operation without mishaps, one can see how much such future
operation can be. We will call the value of Tfut for which this confidence holds the
“confidence horizon” that the experience Tpast supports for that required confidence
level.
E.g., for a required confidence 95%, the plot shows that if I have Pp = 0.9 the
confidence horizon is about 5 times Tpast (the exact value of the probability for Tfut =
5 Tpast is 0.94). It is useful to visualise the confidence horizon as a multiple of Tpast.
We will write Thor = kTpast, so in this case k = 5; we will use this value in our
examples below.
2.3 Bootstrapping confidence; confidence horizon in amount of op-
eration and in calendar time
Our scenario is now as follows. A required probability of no mishaps has been chosen.
For this required confidence level, the current Pp value gives a “confidence extension
coefficient” k that determines the confidence horizon, Thor = kTpast. On this basis,
a fleet of vehicles is allowed to operate. If the fleet size is constant, and the way it
is operated (environments in which they run, times of operation, kinds of trips, how
many trips of each kind per day or month) does not change, then the formulas for the
confidence horizon, although written in terms of future number of demands, could just
as well be written in terms of time on the road, or calendar time: each one of these
measures is proportional to the others. If we use lowercase ‘t’ for calendar time, while
20 October 2021 5
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Figure 1: Probability of one or more mishaps over Tfut future demands, supported by given Pp
and Tpast amount of past mishap-free operation.
keeping uppercase ‘T’ for amounts of operation (e.g., vehicle-days, or total trips) we
can write that t ∝ T . We define an average rate of operation, oavg (measured in
demands/vehicle/year, i.e., kms/vehicle/year, or trips/vehicle/year, etc, depending on
the definition of “demand” adopted for measurement), and assume that every vehicle
operates at this rate – an approximation that will become good enough once enough
vehicles are on the road (we will discuss its limitations later). So, at any time, we
have clear indication of what our confidence horizon is, and this is growing longer;
alternatively, if our main interest is the probability of avoiding mishaps over a fixed
horizon, our confidence in this is growing constantly.
But suppose that the vehicle is in production: the fleet size is increasing. A given
confidence horizon Thor = k ∗ Tpast has to be spread over an increasing number of
vehicles: in calendar time, my confidence extension coefficient will be less than k. In
other words, thor/tpast < Thor/Tpast. The confidence horizon is a necessary time
buffer for decision makers: could the growth of fleet size reduce it too much? Will it
progressively shrink to nothing? We study these questions below.
2.3.1 Case 1: constant number of vehicles
At any time t, with a constant number n of vehicles, Tpast = tpast n oavg and thor =
ktpast.
As time passes, the future horizon of confidence expands, proportionally to the time
elapsed. This may be a quite satisfactory situation, e.g. if I am in early pilot operation
with a fixed number of vehicles, and want to run this pilot phase for e.g. one year, then,
in our example of k=5, after 2 months in operation I will have sufficient confidence of
mishap-free operation for the remaining 10 months; and this confidence will increase
towards 100%, as is natural, as more time passes without mishaps; or if I am concerned
about a fixed population (type Z vehicles, e.g. the set of autonomous bespoke heavy
load vehicles in a certain mine), after 1 year I will be confident enough for the next
5 years, and if the planned operating life is - say - 30 years, after 5 years we will be
confident enough of safe operation for the rest of the operating life.
With the confidence horizon expanding constantly, if we were interested just in
absence of mishap for a constant period into the future, a constant tfut, say one year,
or 5 years, our confidence in this outcome would keep increasing. This will remain
true for the other scenarios that we examine next.
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2.3.2 Case 2: linear growth of number of vehicles
Suppose now that after a pilot period of operation, a production line is activated that
delivers vehicles at a constant rate rv . Let us count time from this moment. The pilot
period accumulated a total amount of operation (demands) Tp, so that we have “ac-
cumulated confidence” for a future amount of operation kTp, considered sufficient to
decide to start production. As the fleet grows, we can soon ignore this initial ”capital”
of confidence, as it becomes negligible compared to that accumulated through opera-
tion of the mass-produced vehicles. We assume for the sake of simplicity that every
vehicle starts operation as soon as produced, and all operate at the same rate oavg .
We want to calculate the confidence horizon after a time tpast has elapsed from the
start of mass production (and mass operation) of the AV type. The amount of operation










giving a confidence horizon
Thor = k Tpast (5)
To translate this into calendar time, we consider that
Tpast + Thor = (k + 1)Tpast (6)
hence, substituting from (4):
Tpast + Thor =





and observing that, by analogy with (4):
Tpast + Thor =




one sees from equating (7) and (8) that:
Thor =
(√
k + 1− 1
)
tpast (9)
e.g., for our example of k=5, Thor ≈ 1.45 tpast.
That is, after 1 year of operation, we have gained the required confidence in future
mishap-free operation for approximately another year and a half.
We can call the coefficient on the right hand side
klinear =
√
k + 1− 1 (10)
We note that:
• this result does not depend on the production rate, but only on it being constant;
• though always smaller than k, for a high enough k this coefficient klinear , of the
order of
√
(k), can still be high, e.g. for k = 10 , klinear ≈ 3.58.
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Table 1: Some values of Pp and resulting confidence extension coefficients.
2.3.3 Increasing the rate of production or of operation
If the production rate increases, the confidence horizon will decrease accordingly (or
confidence will decrease if we want the same horizon). E.g., if in the previous ex-
ample, after five years of operation we suddenly double the production rate, by open-
ing another identical production line, the amount of past operation becomes, for any











Tpast + Thor =




rvoavg (t+ thor − 5)2
2
(12)
but it is also true that
Tpast + Thor = (k + 1)Tpast (13)
So, substituting (11) and (12) in (13) and solving, we obtain, for our example with
k = 5:
thor = −t+ 5/2 +
√
24 t2 − 120 t+ 275
2
(14)
which at the time the production increases, has the value 5.8 (units of time): the confi-
dence horizon for the combined output of the two factories is now substantially lower
than that calculated without taking into account the new factory, which was 7.2.
We skip for reasons of space the general solution for this problem, and show an
example of these effects in Figs 2 and 3, for a greater increment (four-fold) in produc-
tion rate and thus a larger dip in the confidence horizon. Note that (1) the effects of the
dip tend to disappear in the long run; (2) if the increase in production rate is assumed
known before it happens, this dip would start, gradually, earlier than shown, as soon as
the confidence horizon for those AVs that were produced before the increase reaches
the moment at which the increase will take place.
2.3.4 Maturity and retirement
If production continues for a long time, older vehicles will start to be retired, hence the
confidence extension coefficient will gradually rise back from klinear , to reach k when
a constant-fleet size equilibrium is reached (new vehicles are added at the same rate at
which older ones are retired). When production is eventually scaled down and ends, as
the fleet size dwindles the confidence horizon will increase even faster, but by then it
will generally already extend beyond the end of the life of the fleet.
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Figure 2: Growth of the confidence horizon in the case of continuous growth of the fleet, and
effects of step increase in production rate. After the increase at time t = 5, the confidence
horizon drops from 11.2 to 4.47, but recovers to the previous value by time t = 11.0.
Figure 3: Ratio between confidence horizon and tpast, constant with continuous growth of the
fleet, and the dip following a step increase in production rate.
20 October 2021 9
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3 Discussion
The discussion until now has assumed that our mathematical model of the real world
processes is correct. We believe that it would be correct in many situations with type-Z
AVs (as we defined them in the introduction), and in much more restricted cases for
type-A AVs. We discuss here the various limits to its applicability, what extra evidence
or research would be needed to extend these limits, and general insight that can be
derived from this study.
3.1 The probability of pfd= 0; “effective fault-freeness”
The form of conservative Bayesian inference we presented relies on a prior probability
Pp of the system having 0 pfd. We and our colleagues have developed other forms,
but this one has advantages of simplicity; discussing it here will address the essential
issues with application to “confidence bootstrapping”.
3.1.1 Probability of pfd= 0
That system pfd may be 0 with non-negligibile probability is plausible for very simple
systems, but not generally for the control functions of AVs, which tend to be complex
and depend heavily on machine learning. However, practically all AV manufacturer
embrace the principle of including “safety monitor” subsystems, which monitor the
vehicle’s situation checking for any violation of preset safety constraints, and have au-
thority for taking emergency action. These are potentially very simple: for instance,
detecting a fixed obstacle via lidar and braking if it is approaching too quickly is a sim-
ple function (in principle). For type-Z vehicles, for which the environment is simple
and safety is paramount, it would be plausible that these safety subsystems are simple
and so well verified to have a high probability of 0 pfd, making our method applicable.
Pp would never be 1, since subtle misunderstandings of the hazards, or errors in verifi-
cation, may happen, but it would be high enough to support useful levels of confidence
in safety. We would not claim that this is possible for class-A vehicles, because: (1) the
dangerous situations that can develop in traffic may be very complex and not amenable
to simple detection or simple accident avoidance decisions; (2) manufacturers are re-
quired to pursue a difficult balance between safety and performance (delivering passen-
gers to destination in times that are comparable to human-driven vehicles). However,
some manufacturer might try this route of making the safety monitor subsystems more
thoroughly verifiable for the whole set of potential hazardous situations.
3.1.2 “Effective fault-freeness”
If the system is complex so that Pp is very small, high quality development and verifi-
cation could still support a prior confidence about the pfd being, if not 0, at least smaller
(better) than a very low bound, qL. We discussed earlier some scenarios in which this
could apply [5]. The prior confidence has the form
∫ qL
0
fQ (q) dq = PL (15)
leading to a probability of operating over Tfut without mishap:
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(1− q)Tfut fQ (q) dq +
∫ 1
qL
(1− q)Tfut fQ (q) dq
≥ PL (1− qL)Tfut +
∫ 1
qL
(1− q)Tfut fQ (q) dq (16)
If qL is such that over the time horizon of interest its contribution to risk is neg-
ligible (or, equivalently, if we limit our predictions to Tfut values for which this is
true):
(1− qL)Tfut ≈ 1 (17)
then (16) is similar to (2) in its effect on prior confidence in mishap-free operation
over Tfut, and ability to improve confidence as mishap-free operation accumulates.
For type-A AVs, condition (17) would probably apply initially only for very short
Tfut. But AV manufacturers have ongoing programmes of accompanying road testing
and operation of their AVs with continuing verification activities in the form of, e.g.,
much more extensive simulated driving, pursuing static verification of some safety
properties, etc. These activities could progressively improve both PL (increasing it)
and qL (reducing it). To what extent this could allow this form of “confidence boot-
strapping” to remain useful, as the operation amounts involved increase, remains to be
studied.
3.2 Conditions for validity of the model
The “Bernoulli trials” model we used assumes that the pfd will not change. This implies
that neither the vehicle, nor its mode of use, change during operation. This condition
may well be verified for type-Z AVs, meant for well-understood tasks in controlled
environments (factories, mines), for which the traditional rule is followed of avoiding
change, as far as possible, for critical functions of safety-critical systems. This rule
exists precisely because change undermines the confidence that has been built through
expensive verification work. For type-A AVs, meant for future mass sale to consumers,
this condition does not seem to hold at the present state of tumultuous development.
The Bernoulli trial model would only apply over short periods of time between up-
grades; although, in the future, maturity of designs and the need to satisfy authorities
and consumers about safety might at some point make changes in self-driving functions
much less frequent.
In these conditions of A-type AVs being frequently upgraded during operation, can
“confidence bootstrapping” work? One way for our model still to help is to convinc-
ingly demonstrate that the changes do not reduce (or they actually improve) safety.
Then, using evidence of safe operation of previous versions of a vehicle, as though it
concerned the latest version, would only err in the direction of pessimism. One of us,
with colleagues, has published examples of how to formalise mathematically this kind
of argument, and how to take into account the uncertainty that may affect them, for
specific scenarios [9–11]. The second paper mentioned also discusses more in depth
the conditions for applying Bernoulli trial models.
20 October 2021 11
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These methods for accounting for “changes for the better” would also apply to
changes of the environment of use. For type-A AVs using public roads, the environment
will certainly be changing, if nothing else due to the increasing presence of AVs. This
may well mean that the environment will gradually become more benign, allowing the
method we presented to be extended along the lines of the papers cited above. Other
ways to account for a changing environment are being studied, including monitoring
the changes so as to update predictions accordingly [12] and making predictions robust
by accepting extra conservatism [13].
In summary, some extensions to deal with changing environment and evolving AVs
are available for specific scenarios, and suggest that research may deliver extensions to
a broader range of scenarios.
3.3 Long-term operation and mishaps
We have described a way of “bootstrapping confidence” on the basis of operating an
AV without any mishaps. With this approach, even a single mishap would completely
undermine confidence in future operation. The question of how confidence would grow
again with subsequent mishap-free operation has been addressed in other studies, for
different contexts [14, 15].
Regarding our current context, it is reasonable to demand that an acceptably safe
AV should not suffer mishaps in early operation: if the target is of the order of less
than one serious accident in 108, or more, kms, one such mishap in the first – say –
100,000 kms would be a very strong alarm signal. It is thus reasonable for our method
to respond with a total loss of confidence.
So, the method we have described is suitable for a type-Z AV (expected to have no
mishaps over its whole lifetime) or the early period of adoption of a type-A AV.
It becomes inadequate later, when a type-A AV, even if acceptably safe, would in-
evitably start to suffer mishaps. The fact is that even if an AV is acceptably safe, in
that its pfd is as required (say, 10−r), as it goes through extensive operation it will still
reach a stage when mishaps are bound to happen. After the first 10r−1 demands, there
is a non-negligible 10% probability of having had at least 1 mishap. After (0.7 10r)
demands, this probability becomes 50%. Thus a mishap in the first 10r−1 demands
poses the question whether this AV has acceptable pfd≤ 10−r, but hit that 10% proba-
bility of an early mishap, or instead possibly has an unacceptable pfd=10−r+1, or even
worse pfd, but hit a lucky, but not wildly improbable, mishap-free run. To answer these
questions, the method we have presented is as yet inadequate. We plan to study exten-
sions in this directions. In the much longer run (after a number of demands much larger
than 10r), the problem disappears: if the rate of mishaps is stable, it is easily assessed
with standard statistical methods, to confirm that the vehicle is acceptably safe (or that
it is not).
Accidents, or even near misses, that appear due to defects of a system, are likely to
trigger attempts to diagnose and remove the defects that cause them, thus – it is hoped
– improving the pfd in subsequent operation. It has been shown [16] that if these events
were due to defects that will be removed, with some probability, following any acci-
dents or near misses, the total number of accidents over the system lifetime will also
be bounded. This bound is affected by the number of defects, and by how effective the
safety monitors are in causing a defect to be detected before it causes an accident. With
machine learning systems, just as with mature, very complex conventional systems, it
cannot be taken for granted that attempts at removing defects will reduce the pfd. One
cannot exclude that such “repairs” will not only be subject to a law of diminishing re-
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turns, but possibly just cause the system pfd to oscillate up and down without a definite
decreasing trend. However, extending the above model to describe these situations may
bring additional insight for this kind of scenarios.
3.4 Risk criteria
We have reasoned so far about scenarios in which the main concern is whether there
will be any mishap (due to the self-driving functions) in operation. This is one of the
possible concerns, appropriate, it would seem, for a public authority that only wants
to authorise operation if there is high confidence that the system will not cause harm;
or for a manufacturer fearing that any accident during the early life of a new model
might turn the public off buying it: accidents would risk all the expected returns on
the massive investment made in development. However, there are other possible view-
points. For instance, accidents may entail compensation costs after each accident; or
recalls after each accident. That is, in some circumstances the dominant concern may
not be whether there will be accidents, but how many. This requires an extension to the
current model.
Last, while we have focused on how the confidence horizon progressively extends
into the future, there will be situations in which the main concern is absence of mishaps
over a fixed term into the future. For these circumstances, the model we have presented
is very satisfactory, as it shows this confidence increasing steadily as experience of
mishap-free operation accumulates.
4 Conclusions
“Bootstrapping” confidence in a system, by operating it on a gradually increasing scale,
with the next increase being deemed safe enough on the basis of safe operation in the
previous increments, is common practice. With systems that are based on machine
learning, hence not amenable to some of the standard ways of gaining confidence in a
software-based system before operation, “bootstrapping” is even more important. We
have presented a formal mathematical way for a sound (conservative) derivation of how
much confidence one can really have on the basis of a certain amount of mishap-free
operation.
This method applies well in some scenarios, specifically assurance in the short
term for the early operation of what we called type-A AVs, those for which assurance
is hardest; and probably whole-life assurance for type-Z ones, those built for extremely
safe operation in constrained and controlled environments.
For other scenarios, our study is an encouraging indication that similar solutions
may be developed, although they may require new research: developing the mathe-
matical methods, but also demonstrating empirically whether the assumptions of these
methods hold in practice (within some acceptable degree of approximation), or devis-
ing variations in design practices (e.g. regarding safety monitors), or in data collection
practices, that would allow the assumptions to be proved valid and thus grant the ben-
efit of a sounder basis for confidence in future safety. There are thus various areas for
future work. On the mathematical side, the most urgent ones probably concern ex-
tending our methods to cover the case in which mishaps do occur (albeit few of them),
so filling the gap identified in section 3.3 between the early, no-mishap days and the
very long term phase in which mishaps are rare but numerous enough to make statisti-
cal analysis straightforward; and extending the efforts mentioned in 3.2 for taking into
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account changes of the vehicle and/or its environment of use.
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